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On Method, Technorealism and 
Aesthetic Capitalism 
Patricia Ticineto Clough 
In the introduction to a collection of essays discussing both Gilles 
Deleuze and Jacques Derrida's writings, the editors, Paul Patton and John Potevi 
refer to Michel Foucault's well-known comment indicating that the 20th century 
perhaps one day would be seen as Deleuzian. I am particularly interested in the 
comment that Patton and Potevi report Deleuze made when asked to respond to 
Foucault's remark. As Deleuze put it : "He may perhaps have meant that I was the 
most na'ive philosopher of our generation. In all of us you find themes like multiplicity, 
difference, repetition. But I put forward almost raw concepts of these, while others 
work with more mediation .. . Maybe that 's what Foucault meant: I wasn't better 
than the others, but more na'ive, producing a kind of art brut, so to speak, not the 
most profound but the most innocent philosopher (the one who felt the least guilt 
about 'doing philosophy.')1 
I begin with this story about Deleuze not merely to mark the influence that that 
generation of philosophers, Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault 's generation, has had on 
my work as a social theorist and cultural critic. Not your generation and not quite 
mine, that generation of philosophers already were becoming known intellectuals 
by the post-World War II years and thus they shared a certain readiness when 
the days of 1968 would turn out to be eventful for their unique elaborations of 
philosophy, indeed hardly recognized as such. Their writings might have been more 
readily recognized as the work of social theorists and cultural critics. Yet having been 
introduced to the English speaking academy through literary studies, art history, 
architecture, film, television, and new media criticism, it would be a circuitous 
route to recognition in the social sciences. Indeed, Deleuze who was translated into 
English mostly in the 1990's is still or only now receiving the attention of English 
speaking social scientists. 
But if it were not only to point to the influence of these philosophers 
on my thinking as a social theorist and cultural critic, why else did I start as I did. 
It was to extend an invitation to you to be na·ive, to be open to the creation of 
'almost raw concepts,' to be social theorists and with less guilt to be philosophical, 
politically engaged, as a new generation of sociologists needs to be, no matter what 
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your focus of study comes to be. So first let me address what I mean in inviting 
you to be social theorists, even while not necessarily inviting you to specialize in 
sociological theory. By inviting you to become social theorists, I mean to encourage 
you to develop a critical capacity that can accompany you in whatever work you 
do as a sociologist. More specifically I mean to invite you to engage in on-ongoing 
exploration of the method with which you come to reading, writing, thinking, 
feeling, knowing. You might suspect that what I am proposing is about reflexivity, 
self-reflexivity or the exploration of a self through a self-consciousness, to take a 
personal or autobiographical turn in relationship to doing sociology, and there is 
something to that to which I will return. But actually I mean to provoke thought about 
autobiography in order to address something like the autobiography of sociology, 
what might better be called a genealogy of sociology's reflexivity, its consciousness 
and self-consciousness. 
I want to point to what George Steinmetz has called sociology's 
"epistemological unconscious," a term he used in arguing that even though 
vigorously denied, sociology still is methodologically positivistic meaning that the 
play of various combinations of positivism, empiricism and scientism serves as 
sociological method's "center of gravity."2 I am reminded too of Michel Foucault who 
pointed to the productivity of what he called a "positive unconscious of knowledge," 
arguing that the doing of a science is made possible by what cannot be thought in 
the terms of that science. 3 So I hope to point to the importance of methodological 
considerations in producing a sociological imagination for our times -first by drawing 
out the implication of the disavowed operation of a methodological positivism in 
sociology while at the same time stepping back from long held assumptions about 
the opposition between the subjective and the objective in the often battled-over 
claims that something is unscientific in being merely subjective, on one hand, and 
on the other, that the claim to objectivity is merely a blind subjectivism without 
any accountability, especially political accountability, such that the claim to being 
non- political in work is often taken by others in fact to be political . I hope you will 
consider with me that these battles and reversals around subjective and objective 
are a visible trace on the surface of sociology's epistemological unconscious or its 
methodological positivism--a surface we might refer to as style or writing style. 
Actually although Steinmetz never fully discusses it, he does propose that scientism 
in the trio, positivism empiricism and scientism, refers to the style of presentation in 
Sociology, writing the surface of its epistemological unconscious. 
So if I am suggesting, as I would like to do, that to rethink the sociological 
imagination means creating methodologies that are neither subjective nor objective, 
it is because I would like to remind you of the apparatuses of imagination, the 
apparatuses of the world production and distribution of imaginaries. The screens, 
machines and makers of dreams need interrogation as we are confronted with a 
technology or a new media technology that has reformulated presentational style 
or performativity and has done so as other media technologies have done in the 
past, each in its own way by deploying a literary realism. Now if realism is the style 
of presentation that produces a sense of reality existing outside our perception 





of it or proposes that our perception is only a perspective on a given reality, then 
realism in the 18th century, at least in Europe, not only becomes the style of painting 
and literature-the realist novel for example arises in the late eighteenth century-
-but realism also becomes the presentational style of a positivist empiricism. It 
becomes and still is the style of Sociology through and beyond the post-World War 
II years of the Fordist/Keynesian era, when social science, privileges researchers' 
doing organized full fledged empirical studies, surveying populations to bring their 
practices in line with mass production and mass consumption. 
In the post-World War II years, Steinmetz concludes: "the muting of capitalist 
crisis made it increasingly plausible that social practices really were repeatable in 
ways that could be captured by statistical models and replicable experiments."4 In 
investing in the production of the statistical personage or what was then called 'the 
generic American,' Sociology, in the post-World War II years, tightly tied sociality to 
the individual subject as a representative of the various statistical populations that 
Sociology created and that it allowed to stand in for what we refer to still as the 
social structural Even C. Wright Mills who gives us a sociological imagination for his 
times by aiming criticism at the very kind of research Steinmetz is describing, would 
nonetheless use the statistical in pointing to the social structural and the historical: 
his used examples, as you remember, such as if one man looses a job, if one couple 
gets divorced, you have a personal trouble but when the divorce rate is high or the 
unemployment rate is high, well then you have a social issue, a social structure 
historical issue, written however in the discourse of rates and population statistics. 
As Sociology writes the structural in terms of statistical populations it displaces 
from the center of methodological considerations, critical theories of power/ 
knowledge and the aesthetics of representational practices. And further because 
statistical populations are irreducible to individuals or even communities and are 
rather virtual or probabilistic assemblages, there is an urge if not a compulsion for 
Sociology to give a human face or figure to statistical populations, often through 
ethnographic portraiture or the case study such that Sociology by intention or by 
appropriation becomes more amenable to humanistic liberal or neoliberal policy 
and programming. 
In this same context we might consider the relatively recent fate of identity 
politics-- its morph into liberal and neoliberal multicultural policy and programming. 
We might think of the insistence of identity politics on the personal as political, 
thereby making demands for personal recognition especially from the state, which 
however had to be based on statistical or counted or accounted for populations. So 
the demand for human rights, for example, usually is articulated against statistical 
populations such as Blacks, Women, Queers, the incarcerated, the addicted, etc. 
but also populations of problems, such as poverty, disenfranchisement criminality, 
physical and mental incapacity. These two population series, brought together 
through statistics and personalized ethnographic portraiture and case study, can 
make it difficult to engage the critical theories I have already mentioned, concerning 
power/knowledge and the aesthetics of presentation, as matters of methodology 
or as a way to think critically of Sociology's place in what Foucault described as 
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biopolitics or the govern mentality of liberalism and neoliberalism. 
In the recently published English translations of his lectures of the late 
1970's, Foucault both defines biopolitics as "this very specific albeit very complex, 
power that has the population as its target, political economy as it major form of 
knowledge and apparatuses of security (or dispositifs) as its essential technical 
instrument," and he links biopolitics to neoliberal governance. 5 Refusing that view 
of neoliberal governance as a matter of stripping away the state so as to free the 
economy to pursue its true expression, or what has been called deregulation, 
Foucault instead has proposed that regulatory activities of government have been 
hyperactive in neoliberalism. Or as he puts it: Neoliberalism should not be identified 
with laissez faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity and intervention. But 
this does not mean that neoliberal governance intervenes in the economy directly 
so much as governance secures the conditions of possibility of the market both by 
assisting in the calibration of the market's indeterminate and non-totalizable features 
to risk management and by inviting a crisis oriented sociality. These, a speculative 
economy of risk and a crisis-oriented sociality, have been especially marked in the 
state's participation in a production of suspicion and fear through a population racism 
applied for example in the war terrorism, immigrant deportation and detention, not 
to mention mass incarceration and reentry programming. All of which have led to 
the consolidation of apparatuses or dispositifs for organizing, assessing and investing 
life and death, understood biopolitically. So, if neoliberalism governs life and death 
it does so biopolitically, that is, it artificially optimizes the generativity of species 
life, or of nature generally, where species life however is taken up in terms of the 
probabilities or improbabilities of the life chances of statistical populations, where 
populations are not so much of human groups but populations of capacities, human 
capital measures, estimations of genetic potentiality, or environmental sustainability 
probabilities. 
As these examples suggest biopolitical governance of life and death means 
the production and management of "specific aggregate effects of populations 
irreducible to a smaller frame." 6 And it is through these aggregate effects that 
populations have economic effects that further induce the movement, or the activities 
of populations--the further circulation of these as probabilities. Here, what I referred 
to earlier as the human face or figure offered through ethnographic portraiture or 
case study serve not only to humanize populations when in fact they are not human 
but the human face and portraiture also help to integrate individual phenomena 
within a collective field in the form of quantification. This increasingly allows for a 
comparison of normalities instead of merely distinguishing between the normal and 
the abnormal. With the biopolitical governance of life and death, "the normative," 
Brain Massumi has argued undergoes rapid inflation, as classificatory and regulative 
mechanisms are elaborated for every socially recognizable state of being .... such that 
'normal' is now free-standing, no longer the opposite and necessary complement 
of 'abnormal,' 'deviant,' or 'dysfunctional,' as it was under disciplinary power ... " 7 
The biopolitical governance of life and death is less disciplinary, less concerned 
with producing subjects by inducing in them an adherence to the ideologies of the 





nation-state. Or at least we might say, as Foucault does, that "populations are not 
to be seen from the standpoint of the juridical-political notion of subject, but as a 
sort of technical political object of management and government ... dependent on a 
series of variables open to manipulation and modulation."8 
Populations also do appear in the guise of "publics," that is, in the guise of 
"opinions" circulating in bodies of data.9 To be sure, publics are not the public imagined 
to be engaged in discourse about or argumentation ove r narrative knowledge with 
truth claims addressed to subjects of right. Publics rather point to a circulation of 
ways of doing things, ways of being, opinion addressed to an audience and not even 
a mass audience. And if here Foucault 's description of the circulation of publics and 
opinion already suggests something about the more contemporary situations of 
today's media communication and information technologies, it also should be noted 
that the tension between publics and the public, between addressing subjects and 
circulating opinion among audiences already informed reading by the eighteenth 
century when the realist novel as well as newspapers becomes popular. 
But what is different about the technology that is ours today is, for one, 
the havoc it has wrought on realism in that it is a technology of simulation, that is 
to say, the digital production of images can be without reference to reality. Or to 
put it a better way, digital imaging does not necessarily re-present; it does not even 
present copies. If literary realism was meant to create a sense of a given reality 
outside human perception, digital technology also is realist but it produces reality 
as simulation, as information flow, not as re-presentation or copy. As such, the 
digital image is in-forming: it touches and sounds, drawing attention and inviting 
participation through affective attunement. 
Now affect is not to be understood first and foremost as emotion or named 
feelings. Rather it is the very capacity to be affected or to affect, the preconscious, 
pre-individual potentiality to act and be acted upon. Its truth is felt in terms of 
resonance or vibration across the dynamic matter of bodies and not only human 
bodies. What is asked in terms of truth is less what a body is and more what a body 
does or can do, can become, can become with other bodies. Affect refers to material 
processes of becoming without or outside human perception or consciousness, since 
it embodies other than human bodies only. But as for human bodies or in relationship 
to human bodies, digital technology's vocation I would say is to be the body's 
affective milieu, its sensational surface or skin and as such to function affectively 
below human perception at the infra empirical level of bodily proprioception. I am 
thinking on one hand of the ubiquity of information technologies or imaging that 
digitization has made possible, and on the other, the ongoing efforts to make digital 
technologies themselves able to simulate listening, touching, sounding, that is, for 
digital technologies to function as affective sensate bodies much more than cognitive 
subjects or artificial intelligences. I am also thinking of the more general affect of 
digital simulation on life sciences, on life itself in the continuing development of 
biotechnologies. And adding to that the rethinking in physics of energy matter as 
in-formational, there is a configuration of mathematics, physics, biology and digital 
simulation in te rms of which realism and the empirical are being rethought inviting 
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us also to rethink sociological, measure and method. 
To do so will require an imagination born of intense creativity. This may mean 
as I have been suggesting that we rethink the imaginary or the psyche altogether. 
Or to think the psychic or imaginary in terms of different techno-realisms. Each 
techno-realism fixes the psyche or imaginary in a way that allows them to take up 
what had to be hidden in the construction of reality, or what is referred to as of late 
as the social construction of reality, where each techno-realism both relies on and 
disavows the working of unconscious processes in a way that is befitting to each. So 
the cinema and television are different, different in relationship to the realism each 
produces and the unconscious each produces. And digital imaging also is different 
and its psyche is different but it is different in that digital imagining doesn't so much 
hide as function below consciousness, non-phenomenologically, in producing a 
realism of simulacra. 10 
Pointing to a material process or matter as dynamic process with out 
human perception, the psyche of the digital finds its place in relationship to measure 
and what has been described as the impossibility of measure in relationship to 
the time of affect or the before or beyond human perception of pure potentiality, 
an impossibility however that arises just at the very same time that digital is the 
technology that means to directly be effective below and beyond consciousness, to 
modulate or measure potentiality itself. So this is the problematic of politics in our 
time. And to put this problematic in play with economy, market, and governance, let 
me shift our focus a bit. 
In her recent discussion of branding, Christine Harold suggests that rather 
than offering a mark of subject status attached to commodities, brand now makes 
things signs that exude and transmit affect or potentiality, befitting what she has 
called "aesthetic capitalism". 11 Brand then is meant to function affectively, to stir 
bodily propensities, or potentialities, to initiate activation through moods or feelings 
in relation to a political economy. This branding seeks to produce a surplus value of 
"audience effect" or affect in a political economy that embeds what Luciana Parisi 
and Steven Goodman have called "the mnemonic control" of a preemptive logic.12 
For Parisi and Goodman, the operation of pre-emption through branding seeks 
to remodel long term memory through an occupation of or the parasiting on the 
dynamics of short-term intuition or where past present and future coexist as affect 
or potentiality, which repeatedly instigates activation in the neurophysiological 
plasticity of the body-brain. Branding's occupation of short term intuitions is 
something like a distribution of memory implants, which provides you with the 
bodily or affective sense of an experience you haven't had or a memory you haven't 
had, giving a base for future activation or repetition. It is a potentiation or an 
activation however that means to foreclose actualization, collapsing potentiality 
back on itself producing a surplus of affect. Indeed, the power of preemptive logic 
therefore points to biopower or better beyond biopower Not just the governance of 
life and death but a move to that which is non lived or proceeds or goes beyond life 
in order to modulate potentiality or affect-itself. 
It is in relationship to these powers, gaining force in our present that, I want to 





argue, that measure and therefore method are becoming aesthetic. And when I say 
measure and methods I mean the measures and methods that I have been talking 
about, those belonging to sociologists and governance alike where governance 
seeks its veridiction in its relationship to the conditions it provides for the market 
in managing life and affect - the market of aesthetic capitalism. Measure and 
method will become increasingly particular to its simulation not to a given reality. 
And therefore it will be a productive measure changing what measure is each time 
and what is measured each time and the units of measure each time. What goes 
by performance these days will become the norm and we will have to start soon 
inventing something beyond it or making more of it. By performance then I mean 
a turning of knowledge production into an affective modulation of an audience, an 
upping or downing of affect, a speeding or slowing of the affective register. This 
does not mean ignoring research or any means of collecting data; it means that 
presentation becomes more important, more central than it ever has been as a 
measure of truth. 
1 Patton, Paul and John Protevi (eds.) 2003. Between Deleuze & Derrida. New York: Continuum, 
6. 
2 Steinmetz, George. 2005. "The Epistemological Unconscious of U.S. Sociology and the Tran-
sition to Post Fordism: The Case of Historical Sociology". In Remaking Modernity Politics, His-
tory and Sociology, edited by Julia Adams, Elisabeth Clemens, and Ann Orloff. Durham : Duke 
University Press, 119. 
3 Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things. New York: Pantheon Books, xi . 
4 Steinmetz, 129. 
5 Foucault, Michel. 2007. Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the College De France 
1977-1978. New York: Palgrave Macmillian, p.108. 
6 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 104 
7 Massumi, Brian. 1998. "Requiem for Our Prospective Dead : Toward a Participatory Critique 
of Capitalist Power". In Deleuze and Guattari: New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Cul-
ture, edited by E. Kaufman and K. Jon Heller. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 57. 
8 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 70. 
9 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 75. 
10 It should be noted that what is called social construction ism usually does not see the work-
ing of the unconscious in it. For further discussion on this disavowal in relationship to techno-
realism see my End(s) of Ethnography: From Realism to Social Criticism . New York: Lang Pub-
lishing (1998). 
11 Harold, Christine. 2009. "On Target : Aura, Affect, and the Rhetoric of 'Design Democracy'". 
In Public Culture no. 21, 611. 
12 Parisi, Luciana and Steve Goodman. Forthcoming 2011. " Mnemonic Control". In Beyond 
Biopolitics: Essays on the Governance of Life and Death, edited by Patricia Ticineto Clough and 
Craig Willse. Durham : Duke University Press. 
Formations Vol. I No. I 20 I 0 11 
_J 

